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CHAPTER 4 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERMAN RAILROAD SYSTEM 
G. Wolfgang Heinze and Heinrich H. Kill 
1 Patterns of growth: An overview 
Looking at the historical development of the German railroad network, 
one can identify four stages of development1 • The primary stage (from 
about 1815 to 1840) involves the period when the original concept of 
building railways evolved and the ftrst linkages of local importance 
were realized. During the following period (1841 to around 1875), 
connections between all the cities were built. During the third stage, 
which ended with the First World War, the existing lines were extended 
into rural areas and a feeder network was established.2 The fmal 
stage, which continues into the present, is characterized by the decline 
of the German railroad system. This stage began with a period where 
railroad construction stagnated during the 1920s and led to the fust 
closures of unproductive lines in the 1930s. Although this trend was 
arrested during the Second World War and its aftermath, these closures 
continued and were intensifted during the last three decades. The 
connections remaining were adapted to advanced railway technology 
to meet present and future demands (Figure 1). 
An analysis of other large technical systems indicates that this 
pattern of development is in no way unusual. A closer look at other 
transportation systems, as for example the development of inland water 
transport, inner city transit systems, or that of motorized road traffic 
similarly reveals four stages: 
1. invention and isolated introduction (localized linkage), 
2. demand-oriented construction (integration) - fulftlling only the needs 
of existing business centers, 
Figure 1: Stages of German Railway Development 
Period General characteristics German railways 
Primary Stage Invention and isolated The original concept of building railways 
(1815-1841) introduction evolves (abroad): mostly private companies 
(isolated linkages) realize first linkages of local importance. 
Secondary Demand-oriented Connections are built between all major 
stage construction (integra- cities: governmental influence and even 
tion) management grow. 
(1842-1875) 
Tertiary 
Demand and supply- The state-owned but independent 
oriented extension "Landerbahnen" in the German states 
stage (intensification) are developed. 
(1876-1913) Existing lines are extended into rural ar~as 
and a feeder network is established. 
Final stage Maintenance oriented The Reichsbahn company is founded and 
( 1920 till "cut back" (selection) 
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3. supply-oriented extension (intensification) - supplying even the 
remote parts of the country motivated by the belief in equal access 
rights, 
4. maintenance-oriented "cut back" (selection) - accepting efficiency 
as a basic principle and taking into account that different systems 
might complement each other. (In the case of road and freeway 
traffic the last stage has not yet been fully developed.) 
One might therefore conclude that this is a general pattern in 
the development of successful technical systems serving a specific 
function. Whether system development will be successful is decided 
in the early stages of the process. The first decades of the German 
railroad system are also an excellent example of the decisive importance 
which the environment has for the system's chances of being successful. 
This paper will therefore concentrate on the first two stages of railway 
development we have identified in the beginning. We shall show in 
more detail that the development of the German railways was a sober 
economic affair of local interests. To overcome transportation bottle-
necks, an existing technology was used in a new field and combined 
with another innovation of the era. The solution was found by engi-
neers and travellers who were exposed to new ideas of solving prob-
lems tried by enterprises in England. The commitment of a few men 
led to independent innovative actions of a few communities. The 
overwhelming response of the social environment shows that the specific 
historical situation evoked transportation innovations and made the 
superior variant "railways" the superinnovation of bridging space. The 
polity only reacted to these events: Because it was a success, railway 
building became a favorite tool of governments. 
The key elements of the German railroad era can be summed up 
in seven theses which will structure our argument. 
1. Railways initially confronted rulers with a dilemma: On the one hand 
the railways were a very efficient or even necessary way to improve 
the economic situation and raise revenues, but on the other hand 
they increased the wealth and power of the bourgeoisie. Political 
response to the technical innovation was therefore ambivalent. 
2. Time was ripe for a change because the old structures had reached 
their limits. In comparison to England, Germany was economically 
underdeveloped, though industrialization had already started. Popula-
tion growth was high and labor migrated from the country into 
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the towns. Politically Germany was a loose confederation of 33 
independent states (Deutscher Bund), which induced a deep desire 
for unification. Power was divided: Kings and the aristocracy held 
political power, while the bourgeoisie had the economic power. 
This historical situation with its various strains affected railroad 
development deeply. 
3. In the initial phase there was a market for the railway, but most 
of the actors did not know it. The railway came on the stage when 
the general demand for transport had already grown enormously, 
but for most people improvements of existing transport facilities 
(waterways, roads, vehicles and traffic organization) seemed to be 
more than sufficient to meet new demands. 
4. There were few who understood the new technical system and 
its rules. Most actors were caught in a cage of traditional thinking. 
5. The fact that railway technology was introduced by transfer from 
abroad shaped the emerging system. 
6. The state strongly influenced railway building, though private 
enterprises constructed and owned most of them. 
7. The success of this technological innovation was its mass effect: 
Rising utilization led to profits and cost reductions, which triggered 
a positive feedback making the railways the leading sector of German 
industrialization. 
The railway was more than a new means of transportation with 
higher capacity. It opened new psychological, social, economic, political, 
and military dimensions, maybe comparable to the first flight across 
the Atlantic or the first landing on the moon. Until the advent of 
the railway, transportation was mostly dependent upon horses, the force 
of wind and the speed of running water. Travelling was a tough busi-
ness, costly, slow and risky. Horses and carriages were something for 
the rich and powerful. In Germany the ordinary man went over long 
distances on foot. The railway changed all that. This new way of 
space-bridging and mobility led to a new perception of space, distances, 
speed and time. And this new means of transportation was not only 
something for big cities but could be used by everybody to go nearly 
everywhere and in all directions. The world shrank and the multi-
state system became an anachronism. At the same time, however, new 
kinds of accidents caused fear, and technology was felt as a threat. 
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2 The historical background 
In the beginning of the 19th century, when the Napoleonic Wars were 
followed by political restoration, Germany re-established its multi-state 
system. Only a few of the reforms of the Liberation Wars remained 
in force; the Stein-Hardenberg Reforms, in particular, were hardly 
affected. But the bourgeoisie did not receive the promised share in 
political responsibility. Only in some minor German states were parlia-
ments set up so that they could be called constitutional monarchies. 
This was still the political situation in the first phase of railway 
development. The few political changes that did take place, while 
containing the seed for substantial future changes, did not actually 
affect the political balance of power at the time. But they affected 
the chances of the railways. Especially the foundation of the "German 
Zollverein" in 1834 must be mentioned here. Though this simply meant 
that many of the German states (with the important exclusion of 
Austria) adopted the Prussian trade and customs regulations3 , a market 
big enough for a substantial growth in trade and commerce was created. 
Apart from that, the nationalistic liberal movement that ended in 
the suppression of the 1848 revolution and the enfranchisement of 
all three classes was important, as it helped to increase especially 
passenger traffic within Germany. 
When the idea of building railways arose, the governments found 
themselves in a dilemma with respect to this new means of transporta-
tion. On the one hand, it was clearly seen by most officials that 
railways were a very efficient or even necessary way to improve the 
economic situation and the competitiveness of the country - and hence 
it was a way to raise states' revenues. On the other hand, the spreading 
of the railway network had two important disadvantages: first it 
contributed to the wealth and power of the bourgeoisie who built it 
because the absolutistic governments did not have the money and 
were unwilling to borrow it because of the political obligations attached. 
Secondly, the railways improved the mobility of the people and therefore 
the diffusion of new ideas beyond a point still regarded as tolerable. 
This is why early on the Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm Ill did not 
even permit the privately fmanced building of a railway. Later most 
states and their monarchical governments publicly supported the idea 
of building railways, but in fact often worked against their actual 
construction4 • 
Figure 2: 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERMAN RAILWAY 
NETWORK 1842 - 1913 
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The fact that the railways, despite many obstacles, actually spread 
in Germany with a time lag of only 10 to 15 years as compared to 
England shows that other - mainly socio-economic and technical -
factors were favorable to such a development. 
While the political framework stayed quite static, the economy, 
transportation technology, and technical development generally were 
undergoing rapid changes, creating pressures for structural adaptation. 
Until the 1830s, the German economy was clearly dominated by agricul-
ture, with up to 80% of the workforce engaged in food production. 
Only in Saxony and in the Prussian Rhineland was a majority already 
engaged in trade and manufacturing. But even there, manufacturing 
took place in small plants with few workers and modern machinery 
was based only on a very small scale usage. From today's point of 
view the use of steam power is regarded as the symbol of industrializa-
tion. But the few German steam engines - not even one tenth of the 
number they had in England - were mostly used for water pumping, 
especially in the coal and salt mines but also in factories which had 
water powered machinery. 
In England the use of machinery and steam engines, together with 
modern forms of management and production organization, led to an 
immense increase in productivity and consequently to a decrease in 
the prices of products. The German craftsmen therefore could not 
compete with the British factories, even more so as the influx of 
British goods was not really hindered by taxation during the first 
years after the end of the "Blockade of Britain". The introduction of 
large-scale production in Germany after the 1830s was mainly based 
on two factors: the introduction of foreign methods of mechanized 
manufacturing and the introduction of new ways of fmancing which 
led to the founding of joint-stock companies. In order to raise the 
required capital these companies offered shares to the public. This 
method was originally used by the trade companies engaged in trade 
with the West and East Indies. But in these companies the share-holder 
also had to account for the losses of the company. The first modern 
joint -stock company enabled the shareholders to share the companies' 
profit, but limited the risk to the value of their share. In Germany 
such a company was founded for the first time to fmance a coal railway, 
where the wagons carrying coal were drawn by horses. 
Technological development during this time was generally character-
ized by the shift from medieval technologies based on water-powered 
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wooden machinery to modern ways of production using steam-engines 
and advanced machinery. Along with improvements in the iron, steel 
and mining industries, German mechanical engineering developed. The 
most important factors in this development were the rising level of 
general education, and the installation of model factories with advanced 
foreign technologies. The educational reform policy led, among other 
things, to the foundation of the first German technical universities 
in Prague in 1806 and in Karlsruhe in 1825. In Prussia the "Konigliche 
Gewerbeinstitut" was founded in 1821 in Charlottenburg near Berlin 
(this later became the "Technische Hochschule"). This kind of moderniza-
tion was supported by the government5 • Prussia, the most important 
German state, was large enough to need a bureaucratic administration 
and it employed many modern, economically thinking professionals. 
3 Rising transportation demand and the difficult search for a niche 
The now growing industrial production with its even faster growing 
demand for transportation revealed the weakness of the existing 
transportation system. Besides the trading companies, which were 
traditionally interested in good transportation facilities, the management 
of the heavy industries was now interested in improving the transporta-
tion sector. 
During the Middle Ages it was above all improvements in vehicles 
that maintained or even enabled the increase in the volume of transpor-
tation.6 Paved roads in general did not exist. Only at specffic locations, 
e.g. river crossings, swamps or mountain slopes, was construction work 
regarded necessary. Together with the development of national economies 
in Western Europe, the 18th century saw the first nationwide road 
building since the Roman Empire in Europe. The importance of good 
traffic connections as a prerequisite for the development of a nation 
was realized especially in multi-state Germany. In 1779 Christian von 
Liider demanded a network of high quality roads connecting all the 
important cities of central Europe. Interestingly, this plan asked for 
"Chaussee" connections very similar to the later network planned for 
railroads by Friedrich List7 to promote a unffied Germany. They are 
also almost identical with the 20th century plans for the Reichsauto-
bahnen. None of the three networks was actually built on the basis 
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of these plans. Only independent connections were built, due to the 
influence of state and local particularism, the importance of profitability 
as a criterion and, in the case of the Autobahnen, because of strategic 
planning. Nevertheless, over time the networks evolved to a state 
surprisingly similar to the one originally conceived. 
Despite the fact that new roads and canals were built during the 
time of Mercantilism and especially during the Napoleonic occupation, 
traffic connections as a whole were not in a good shape. This became 
obvious when the demand for transportation facilities increased in 
the 20s and 30s of the last century. Nobody doubted the need for an 
improvement of the transportation system, but as nobody could predict 
that the increasing demand for transport would continue, the need for 
a completely new transportation mode was not evident. For most people 
improvements of the waterways, the roads, the vehicles and of the 
traffic organization seemed to be more than sufficient to meet future 
demand. This clearly worked against speedy railway development. As 
late as 1834, a canal was chosen to connect the Danube and Main. 
Besides the advantage of the canal for transporting timber - Bavaria's 
most important export product of that time - the people responsible 
for this decision had two main arguments against the railroad. First 
mistrust in the reliability of the new machinery, and secondly disbelief 
in a steadily growing demand for transportation.8 
Furthermore the power of steam engines could be used more easily 
on waterways than on land. In those days steam engines were quite 
big and heavy and needed huge amounts of coal, and it was much 
easier to put this additional weight on a boat than on a wagon. There-
fore, as early as 1816 a steamship was used for a shuttle service by 
the Prussian Post Office between Berlin and Potsdam. Steamboats 
started to operate on the Rhine in 1822. They became so successful 
that in 1830 the "Rheinisch-Preuj3ische Dampfschiffahrtsgesellschaft" 
alone had 27 steamships in service between Koln and Mainz. 9 
Nevertheless, the larger part of the investments in traffic infrastruc-
ture went into highway building. The improvement of these new roads 
was so remarkable compared to the old ones that they were called 
"artificial streets". In the three years from 1805 to 1807, more than 
5,000 km of highways (Chausseen) were built or improved in Bavaria, 
and in Prussia the length of the highways doubled between 1830 and 
1848 to 15,000 km. 
The improvements that followed from these measures (and especially 
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from the improvements in traffic organization) were quite considerable. 
Cargo as well as passenger and mail transportation time was greatly 
reduced and capacity rose in the same manner.10 It can therefore be 
said that there was no general or even national interest in a railway 
system when its building began. Beside the more visionary imaginations 
of some poets and scientists, there were only the local interests of 
tradesmen and manufacturers in different cities who wanted the railroad 
for improving communication and transit of their goods which could 
not be achieved by other means. 
The first article on a (planned) German railway was published in 
1825 and was written by the entrepreneur Friedrich Harkort. Although 
he first described the advantages of a railway connection between the 
North Sea and the Rhine (to avoid the Dutch Rhine customs), his 
true intentions lay elsewhere11• In Wetter by the Ruhr he had founded 
a factory (the later DEMAG) with imported English machinery and 
English workers. The connections to the nearby coal districts were 
very poor. Coal was even transported on horseback. Therefore he 
wanted to improve the transport of coal from the mines to the "Ber-
gisch-Markische" industrial district. Because of his initiative a test 
railway using the Palmer principle and horsepower was built in Elberfeld 
in 1826. This one-rail track was followed by several - now two-tracked -
railways in the Ruhr Region that connected coal mines with neighboring 
cities. 12 Their length was usually only a few kilometers, but on these 
railways one horse could pull more than a tenfold of an ordinary 
carriage. Similar to this case, also in the other regions it was individuals 
who pushed the idea of railways forward13, and quite often projects 
became delayed (or even suspended) because of the death of one man. 
At the beginning of the 1830s, railway projects had sprung up in 
nearly all major German cities.14 Generally these projects were advanced 
by citizens who intended to improve their city's position in the economic 
competition with other cities. The promotion of the railway as a system 
was not the intention of these system-builders. 
Beside these entrepreneurs who were only interested in one particular 
railway line, Friedrich List (1789-1846) was obviously the only man 
with a great plan and with an understanding of the whole system15• 
He failed because he did not adjust to this disjointed incrementalism. 
A design for Germany as a whole was also doomed because general 
interest was lacking. For many reasons List was an outsider. As a 
self-made man with liberal ideas, not rich enough but with a hot temper, 
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he did not belong to any social group of political influence. The nobility 
called him a "revolutionary", the merchants "office-hunter" (Postenjager) 
and the academic establishment "agitator". His personal tragedy was 
that he functioned as a catalyst without reaping any personal benefits. 
His efforts to see Germany as a whole are comparable to our attempts 
to think European. Fixed on his aim, he even opposed "small steps" 
that were improvements of the status quo; he did not understand that 
complex systems have to prefer evolution to revolution because big 
steps lead to extreme rates of change in other subsystems and thereby 
endanger the whole system. Not supporting incremental changes, List 
in fact played into the hands of the reactionaries. The result was 
not a grand solution, but a lagging disjointed incrementalism of German 
railway development. The great names of German railway history are 
all names of losers. Looking backward, von Baader had invented the 
wrong system, Harkort went bankrupt and List committed suicide16• 
Later, however, the decentralized network structure proved to be an 
advantage. According to the unanimous judgement of regional scientists, 
German particularism led to less regional disparities and higher structur-
al adaptability, lowered the costs of regional policy measures and 
improved social consensus. 
4 Early railway construction: The effects of technology transfer, 
capital needs, and state regulation 
The early technological development in the transportation sector abroad 
gave Germany the advantage of being able to adopt complete, proven 
and functioning systems which had already passed their teething 
troubles. The most influential model was the technologically and fman-
cially successful railway between Manchester and Liverpool which 
opened in 1830. One highly significant consequence of this mode of 
innovation by transfer was the introduction of the standardized gauge17• 
Only the state railway of Baden used a larger gauge (which was probably 
better suited for the flat Upper Rhine Valley) in the beginning, but 
changed to the standard in 1855. But technology transfer also had disad-
vantages. The English systems were considered to be in optimal shape 
and improvements were not thought possible18• The plans for the 
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capacity and the routes of the early German railways therefore reflected 
the state of technology England had achieved several years before. 
In this context, the famous "Ludwigs-Eisenbahn" between Niirnberg 
and Fiirth was not the symbol of unique pioneer work in the new 
technology. Two years before its opening, the railway had only been 
one of many projects, but luckily it was finished very quickly. The 
society promoting this railway, the Niirnberg-Fiirther-Eisenbahn-Gesell-
schaft, was founded in the fall of 1833, it got the concession on 
February 19, 1834, and it op~ned only one and a half years later (1835). 
The advantage of the Ludwigs-Eisenbahn was that all obstacles that 
usually delayed the realization of such projects could be overcome 
quickly. Both city councils were in favor of the project and most of 
the money necessary was provided by citizens. The cost for the complete 
railway, including locomotive and wagons, was only 122,000 talers 
(compared to the average of 150,000 to 600,000 talers just for the 
construction of the same length of infrastructure elsewhere). 19 The 
royal privilege that was given with the concession made it even easier 
to raise the money, especially after the King had bought two shares. 
The terrain did not cause any difficulties (aside from the question of 
expropriation); neither bridges nor tunnels were necessary, and all 
streets were crossed at the same level 20• Finally there was no com-
petitive organization fighting the project. 
All other railway projects in Germany were hindered or even caused 
to fail by the problems connected with {1) finances, {2) route-fmding, 
and {3) concessions21: 
1) The fmancial problem had to be solved first. The amounts of 
money necessary for building a railway were extraordinarily high. 
The possible financiers had to be convinced of the success of their 
investment. In the beginning, this was very difficult because no railway 
had yet been built in Germany. Besides, profits could only be expected 
after several years. Therefore many of the potential investors were 
skeptical about the railway's technical performance and its financial 
profitability. But this problem was largely resolved when the "Ludwigs-
Eisenbahn" was built and when it proved to be economically successful: 
After its first year, the company paid a dividend of 20%. 
2) Routing was not so important when discussions about a new 
railway started, as most railways were planned as connections between 
two major cities. But when the actual construction began, many decisions 
had to be made. Which places between the two cities should be con-
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nected to the railroad? In which part of the city should the terminal 
be? Where should rivers and mountains be crossed? How could important 
factories and army forts be reached? How could towns and noblemen 
who declined to participate be circumvented? These kinds of issues often 
delayed construction. 
3) Though private enterprises constructed most early German railways, 
the state could refuse to grant necessary elements: the concession, 
the law to expropriate grounds, and the interest guarantee. The state 
had a seat and a vote in the administration of the companies. Soon 
the various state governments realized that they were indispensable 
to get a railway network which included many necessary, but non-
profitable lines. In spite of this awareness, most German states accepted 
privately owned railways under strict state control. Requests for a 
concession where often promptly met, but generally these concessions 
were tied to a number of preconditions, so that construction work 
could not start at once. Besides this, the government sometimes promised 
concessions to more than one party or withdrew concessions because 
of minor violations of the stipulated conditions. 
Many of the first railway lines proved not to be profitable. Railway 
building became much more expensive than expected. Only Paul Camille 
Denise, a German engineer who had also built the "Ludwigs-Eisenbahn", 
could say that all his railways were profitable. He built simple but 
solid tracks, which meant that the construction costs were relatively 
high at the beginning, but the long-term operating costs could be 
kept low. Higher construction costs are soon past and forgotten. Many 
of the other companies were forced to resort to the interest guarantees 
of the state. 
5 After a difficult start, a quick take-off 
Due to these difficulties all the other railway projects except for 
the Ludwigs-Eisenbahn remained in a planning or even discussion stage, 
until the positive results of the latter became public by 1836 and 
1837. From then on, the interest of governments and of investors in 
railway construction was big enough to push the other projects for-
ward=. Within 5 years, from 1837 to 1841, 680 km of railways were 
opened. The first state railway connected Braunschweig with the Harz 
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mountains (30 km). All the other railways connected nearby cities: 
Berlin and Potsdam (25 km), Leipzig and Dresden (120 km), Frank-
furt!Main and Wiesbaden-Mainz (40 km), Diisseldorf and Elberfeld 
(Wuppertal) (30 km), Munich and Augsburg (70 km), Berlin and Frank-
furt/Oder (100 km), Magdeburg and Leipzig (110 km), Mannheim and 
Heidelberg (20 km), Cologne and Aachen (70 km), Hamburg and Berge-
dorf (20 km). Aside from these lines, some extensions were also in 
progress. These city connections became later the nuclei of the poly-
centric German railway network. 
The railway boom was accompanied by several speculative projects 
which soon proved to be unrealistic (at that time) and many people 
lost their money. Often stock-companies were founded and shares 
sold before the railway got the concession. During this boom the costs 
of building the railways rose immensely. When the "Westfalische Landtag" 
allowed the foundation of the "Koln-Mindener-Eisenbahn Company" 
in January 1831, the 230 km connection of the rivers Rhine and Weser 
was estimated at 600,000 talers. In 1836, when the company was finally 
constituted, this calculation had risen to 4.4 million. In 1840 it had 
risen to 5.6 million. When this railway finally opened in 1847, construc-
tion costs amounted to 13 million talers, i.e. about one fourth of the 
annual budget of Prussia of that time. 
The main reason for the delay in the construction of this particular 
railroad was its length. It was the first railway that was intended 
not only to connect two cities, but was planned as the connection 
between two distant rivers, the Rhine and Weser. This railway can 
thus be called the first German long-distance railway.23 It traversed 
not only densely populated commercial areas, but also rural areas. 
For such areas it was very difficult to raise any money, because it was 
not certain whether the railways could fmd enough passengers and 
cargo there. During the time it took to realize the Rhine-Weser railway, 
the pioneer stage of the railroad systems development had ended. 
By 1840 the importance of the railroad system as a whole for the 
nation or the individual states had become obvious. Only one year 
after the opening of the Koln-Mindener railway, it became the center 
part of the first transnational railroad from Frankfurt/Oder to Aachen 
(with connection to Belgium). Although Prussia adhered to the concept 
of privately owned railway companies for another 40 years, the com-
panies now came under very strict state control. Except for Prussia 
and Saxony, all the other states in Germany now decided to build 
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and operate railways themselves - without necessarily taking over or 
prohibiting all privately owned railways. At the beginning of the 1840s 
the German states made plans for their railroad networks. These plans 
were no longer dominated by the potential traffic between two points. 
Some states planned railways in order to influence the international 
trade routes - or in fact to take them away from the other German 
states' territory.24 One of the main aspects of railway planning was 
now to extend the accessibility to all provinces to give them better 
chances for economic development. But despite these official plans, 
the main reference point - where to start building railway - was the 
existing traffic. Therefore it took only ten more years to ftnish a 
skeleton of railway tracks in Germany. In 1855 Germany had about 
7,500 km of railroads. These lines followed traditional traffic patterns 
of the last thousand years and corresponded very much to the road 
network plan of Liider, or to the railroad plan from Friedrich List. 
Although the main purpose of building the railways had been the 
transportation of goods, in the 1830s and 1840s they primarily attracted 
passengers. The manner in which the railroad network was developed 
made it very difficult to attract cargo. Most railways opened operation 
before they got to the fmal destination, usually when the nearest 
town was reached. Beside the fact that long-time treaties between 
merchants and haulers quite often forced shippers to use road transport, 
there was also the problem of having to transship the cargo between 
different lines as well as between different transport modes. As long 
as the railway could not cover the whole transportation route, repeated 
reloading often took more time than the supposedly fast railway saved. 
In contrast to cargo, passenger figures soon exceeded their predictions 
by far. The predictions were based on the number of people then 
using the carriages between the cities where the railway was planned. 
Most of the additional passengers were former pedestrians, belonging 
to a social group that did not use public transport before, mostly 
because it was too costly. Riding carriages was hardly faster than 
walking. Suddenly by using the railway one could save so much time 
that one could get to the next town, have one's business done and 
return the same day. So even those who usually walked could save 
money: The price for a 30-km return ticket was 2.40 marks in third 
class and only 1.60 marks in fourth class, which is less than what 
one usually had to spend for lodging and eating, not considering the 
one day saved for working and the cost for shoes and clothing. 25 
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The development of the regular passenger transport to such an unprece-
dented and unpredicted degree is one of the best examples of the 
difficulties of future oriented technology assessment26• 
In cargo transportation the importance originally conceded to general 
cargo was very soon displaced by bulk cargo. But in order to compete 
with the water-transport for this kind of cargo, two more developments 
in the railroad system had to happen27• On the one hand the price 
of cargo carriage had to drop almost to the level of water-transport, 
and on the other hand the capacity of the railways had to be increased 
in order to match the amounts of cargo the increasing industries 
demanded. These developments cannot be seen in a network map. 
Most of the coal used in Germany at the time came from England 
and was carried by boats at a rate of about 1 taler-pfennig (i.e. one 
hundredth of a taler) per ton kilometer. As the railway companies did 
quite well with the existing passenger and cargo transportation, they 
saw no necessity to reduce their freight rates, which were about 10-15 
taler-pfennigs per ton kilometer. Due to the involvement of the Prussian 
Secretary of Commerce, August von der Heydt, and because of a 
cooperation among the coal mines in Upper Silesia, the railway company 
serving this area in 1849 offered the first one-pfennig-tariff train to 
Berlin. Within a few years these cheap trains that carried only coal -
which was an innovation as well - became one of the main source 
of revenues. The share of hard coal in the cargo transport volume 
of the Prussian railways rose from 1% in 1850 to 14% in 1860 and to 
31% in 1875. The total coal transport in Prussia reached 1,012.8 million 
tkm in 1865 ( 45.1% of the total cargo transportation) with a freight 
of 37.2 million marks (29% of the railways' cargo revenues}28• In other 
words: although they did not recognize this in the beginning, it was 
the railways themselves that induced the low value mass transport 
demand they were best suited for. 
Yet reasonable prices alone were not enough to initiate this develop-
ment. The railroad network had to be modified to match this rising 
transportation volume. Even when all major destinations where reached 
by the railroad, cargo still had to be transshipped. The different lines 
terminated in the outskirts of the cities. Each line had its own station 
and even if the stations lay sometimes quite closely together, the 
lines did not connect. For the passengers, transfer to the next station 
might have been annoying, but for the cargo this was a real obstacle. 
Furthermore, most of the first railways were single tracks, and the 
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stations along the line were often simply places where the trains 
stopped, which meant that when stopping at a particular station the 
complete line was blocked for the time necessary to load and unload 
cargo. 
Long before Germany was covered by a complete railroad network, 
the improvement of the core network was carried out. In Breslau the 
stations of the Upper-Silesian railway and the Lower Silesian-Markische 
railway were connected in 1850 (this was one of the preconditions 
for the previously mentioned coal train to Berlin). In the following 
year the Prussian state built the semicircular Connection Railway in 
Berlin. Similar connections were built in Leipzig in the same year, 
and in Dresden in 1852. In Cologne, only in 1859 was the Rhine crossed 
by a bridge, connecting the Rhine-Weser railway terminal in Deutz 
with the Koln-Aachen-Antwerpen terminal on the left side of the Rhine. 
Meanwhile the established lines were improved to allow for higher 
speed trains, second and third tracks were constructed, and switches 
were installed in and between the stations. This allowed the bypassing 
of faster trains29 and facilitated direct railroad connections to factories, 
or even to agricultural and mining facilities. 
6 The end of the introduction phase 
By the early 1850s it had become obvious that the railways were utilized 
to the greatest effect when they enabled cargo transportation without 
the need to transship. As the railways were so superior to the tradition-
al ways of transportation, long loop-ways (detours) were accepted in 
order to keep the cargo (or the passengers) on the rail. Although 
the railroad network of that time covered most of the traditional 
trade-routes, some connections were still missing. In the first 20 years 
of railway history several projects had failed because of a specific 
German feature: Political particularism had produced enclaves and 
some absurd borderlines, and traffic routes between two cities in one 
state would therefore have to cross borderlines, but permission to do 
so was usually denied. That made such railways financially unattractive. 
But soon the governments saw the importance of interstate and interna-
tional traffic for the states' own industry and commerce and ensured 
the future of the railways by treaties. Before, it had taken several 
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years to reach an agreement between two German states regarding 
one short railroad. Now within a few years, general treaties between 
the German states and their neighbors were signed covering traffic 
connections between their capitals and between important trade centers. 
This governmental willingness to improve the railroad network soon 
resulted in the closing of still remaining missing links. In Prussia 
the number of concessions granted increased, and in Bavaria the state 
even allowed private companies to build and operate railways. One 
important reason for this increase in concessions was probably the 
intention to intensify competition between the railways; in Germany 
the state railways played the same role as competitors as the private 
companies did in Britain or in America. By 1865 all the old trade 
routes had rail track and each city and mining district could be reached 
without long detours. The length of the railroad network had reached 
nearly 14,000 km. In the early 1870s more than 1,000 km of railroads 
were. built annually, and between 1865 and 1875, 13,700 km. That is 
about the length that had been built in the 30 years before. 
With this completion of the mainline-network, the integrating stage 
of the system's evolution had nearly ended. The connections finished 
during the 1870s had all been planned in this period. It is interesting 
to note that this integration of the railroad network coincided with 
the unification of Germany. After the "Reichsgriindung" of 1871, two 
factors led to the further expansion and subsequently to the intensifica-
tion of the network. For one thing, earlier railway lines had been 
built from town to town so as to collect as much traffic as possible. 
This led to remarkably loopy ways for the traffic between the terminal 
cities. Now, competitive companies established direct linkages between 
major destinations. Secondly and more importantly, competition resulted 
in the building of fmancially doubtful railways into rural areas. However, 
such lines were built not only out of mere speculation, but also because 
of the state's intention to grant improved accessibility to every region. 
So, although the nearly 30,000 km of 1875 covered Germany with a 
complete railway network, railway building continued at the rate of 
about 1,000 km annually (Figure 4). 
Quite often railway building was requested by the towns not yet 
connected. In the wake of industrialization, German towns and communi-
ties situated near the railway network which were not yet serviced 
made strenuous efforts to establish linkages, hoping to help local 
producers. However, the opposite often occurred. Extension of the 
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railway network of the State of Bavaria to these zones caused an 
economic decline, whereas the zones of industrial growth continued 
to expand. Nearly all those production sectors and enterprises in the 
declining zones which had been mentioned in the petitions as justifica-
tion for the requested rail linkage were forced out of the market in 
the long run. Economic development was marked at the junction points 
of the main lines and at the terminal stations in the towns, where 
transfer to road haulage was effected30• 
7 Nationalization of the railways 
During the intensification stage that followed the completion of the 
mainline network after 1875, organizational changes also occurred. This 
period is characterized by the integration of the public railways, which 
were juridically and administratively independent, and the private 
railways to form the "Uinderbahnen", i.e. one state railway for each 
of the bigger German states. 
Although nationalization of the railways had been demanded since 
the beginning, a necessity to do so was never seen by parliaments 
and governments. Especially the already mentioned pioneers of railway 
building, Harkort and List, pleaded for state railways in their flrst 
papers. After the separate railway companies had evolved in Germany, 
they gained most of the advantages of a unified railway by voluntary 
collaboration. Despite their competition, the railway companies had 
started to cooperate quite early. Already in 1846, ten of the 17 Prussian 
railway companies of that time founded the "Verband der Preul3ischen 
Eisenbahnen". The aim of this association was to standardize the 
technical equipment, the rolling stock and the overall dimensions of 
bridges and tunnels so that trains and especially wagons could use the 
tracks of different railways. Furthermore fust regulations for standard-
ized tariffs were discussed. In 1847 all railway organizations in Germany 
founded the "Verein Deutscher Eisenbahnverwaltungen" in order to 
extend these standardization efforts, and before it was possible to 
travel from one side of Germany to the other in the same train, one 
could make such a journey with several trains but one ticket. 
While this system worked very well in peacetime, the disadvantages 
of such a multicompany railway system became evident during the 
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French-German war of 1870-1871. Coordination problems led to delays 
in troop and material transports. These experiences and the spirit of 
the newly created German Reich renewed intentions to unify the 
railways as well. But similar to the case of the German trade policy 
at the beginning of the century, a coalition of economic liberalism 
and political particularism obstructed a solution for Germany as a 
whole. To prevent the possibility of a Prussian dominated German state 
railway, the medium sized states of Bavaria (1875) and Saxony (1876) 
nationalized all important railways in their territory. Prussia, and 
here first of all Bismarck, therefore concentrated unification plans 
on Prussia's own territory and on small neighboring states. Until 1887, 
Prussia bought all private railway companies that operated main lines 
in its territory. 
This polycentric concentration process excluded only small private 
companies that served secondary lines of local importance. At the 
turn of the 20th century, 59,082 km of the 63,794 km of German 
railways belonged to 8 state railways. These states were Prussia, Hesse, 
Saxony, Bavaria, Wiirttemberg, Baden and the small but opinionated 
duchies of Oldenburg and Mecklenburg-Schwerin. 
When the railway had reached this heyday of its development, it 
was not just a new means of transportation with a higher capacity. 
It had become a new dimension of space- and time-bridgingn. The 
railways became the necessary precondition of economic development 
and proved to be very profitable themselves. The annual revenues of 
the 8 state railways averaged more than 1,000 million Reichsmarks at 
that time. 
Because of its importance, the railway was strongly influenced by 
world politics. It was a direct result of defeat in the First World 
War that a national railway company was finally founded in 1920. 
Forced by the peace conditions of the allies and the new constitution, 
the "Uinderbahnen" were unified to the "Deutsche Reichsbahn". As 
the new German Republic could not afford to take credits that were 
necessary to rebuild the damaged railways, the state-owned "Deutsche 
Reichsbahn" was converted into a legally, administratively and fmancially 
independent company, the "Deutsche Reichsbahngesellschaft".32 
Besides paying off its own debts, this company was forced to produce 
600 million gold marks (i.e. about 150 million gold dollars) annually 
to redeem German reparations to the Allies. In the years from 1925 
to 1932 the Deutsche Reichsbahn paid 4.18 billion gold marks, although 
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in 1928 for instance it still had to make repair investments that added 
up to 2.5 billion Reichsmarks. So, at the beginning of the final stage 
of its development, the railway not only faced the competition of a 
new transport technology (i.e. the automobile), but also severe financial 
problems. 
8 Summary and conclusion 
Much as in the introduction of other new transportation systems, 
the railway had to face the strongest opposition in its initial phase. 
The . groups that opposed the railway stood to lose what they had 
achieved with the old and well-known technology. The first supporters 
of the railways therefore pointed out the advantages of the railways 
for the extension of agricultural production and for accessibility to 
the spas (like Baden-Baden). As the Postmaster General opposed most 
of the early railways, mail had to be carried without payment and 
the railways had to compensate for the losses of the mail coaches. 
Because of these obstacles and because of the dominating influence 
of the traditional technologies (especially inland navigation), the railways 
found their first employment in niches or when really no other means 
of transportation was appropriate. As the introduction of the railway 
took place during a period of general growth, the limits of the old 
system's capacity became evident. Other favorable conditions were 
the maturity of the new technology at the right time and the personal 
engagement of open-minded entrepreneurs - men who were familiar 
with the new technology, convinced of its success, and who had the 
economic and political knowledge to push its introduction (Figure 5). 
After the railway had been introduced and had shown its operational 
abilities, other cities and states reproduced it in manifold ways. Because 
of this, the railway could extend and at the same time modify the 
system, i.e. the growth of the new technology actually enabled the 
structural changes that had become necessary. When the railway had 
become the dominant transportation system in the 1870s, its field of 
operation spread over the whole transportation sector. Because of its 
superiority compared to other transportation modes and its economic 
success, railways were built to almost every town and were used for 
nearly every transport purpose. This dynamic mechanism of success 
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can be represented as a four-step acceleration process: (1) the existing 
system reaches its capacity constraints; (2) a new technology is at 
hand; (3) improvements of the old technology and isolated usage of 
the new technology increase demand for transportation; ( 4) this addition-
al demand allows the full engagement of the new technology (Figure 6). 
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After another 70 years and after the diffusion of the automobile, 
the railroad network that is used by the Deutsche Bundesbahn today 
is very much the same as that part of the network that had existed 
at the end of the demand-oriented construction stage. 
The rise and fall of the German railway system suggests some 
interesting conclusions. The growth of urban agglomerations and 
conurbations was connected with the building of the railway system. 
A by-product of this spatial differentiation was the creation of "the 
rural areas". When the main lines had been built, the search for new 
investment opportunities for rail products, together with considerations 
of regional equity, stimulated further extension. Because no better 
means of transport was then available, the feeder rail network had 
to fill the gap. This decreased the profitability and efficiency of the 
whole network, but the transport monopolist of that time could afford 
it. However, the need for a more flexible and faster low cost solution 
for areas of low demand was now felt. To provide everybody with a 
private siding was beyond the abilities of the railway system; the 
highest network density was reached when 75% of the villages were 
accessible by rail. Thus a niche opened up for the automobile. 
A critical point was reached in the 1920s when the railways came 
under competitive pressure from road haulage. Caught in a world of 
railway thinking, the policymakers and their advisers were unaware 
of the different quality and cost proflles of this newcomer. They also 
underestimated the structural changes in general transport demand. 
This miscalculation was portentous because the increasing percentage 
of high-value goods favored the lorry. The political solution (besides 
licensing) was to tie the prices of road freight transport to the high 
tariffs of the railways. This meant that the railways were not compelled 
to concentrate on the market segments they were especially suited 
for. On the contrary, these political measures fed the dangerous illusion 
of being still the general national carrier. The result was inevitable: 
the high prices enabled the road haulers to challenge the railways 
on their own ground. The high prices not only shifted the high value 
goods to the road, but the high profits enabled the road haulers to 
compete with the railway in the market for low value mass-product 
transport between industrial and commercial premises where a substantial 
volume of traffic originates or is discharged. In the 1950s, railway 
managers were ready to lead their state enterprise like a private 
business. But the "Rail Act" remained unchanged and forced the railways 
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to continue behaving as a general means of transport. Whereas the 
road and its transport got nearly everything it wanted from legislators, 
the railroad did not. The end of the story is well-known. 
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